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An upward bias  in measures  of China's  real industrial  output in
the past decade  may  substantially  alter our perception  of the  rate
and  pattern  of Chinese  industrial  growth.  The extent  of such  bias
should  be investigated  and  analyzed  for possible  links  with  other
economic  patterns that may  be more  readily measurable.
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Data  for  recent  years  indicate  an acceleration  of  The  specific  consequences  of decentralized
Chinese  industtirl  growth,  from  the annual  rates  decision~making,  growing  price  flexibility,
of about  10  percent  recorded  in the  quarter  inflation,  dual  pricing  systems,  the emergence  of
century  before  economic  reform  to figures  enterprises  with  few  or no ties  to the  system  of
approaching  15  percent  in the mid-  and  late  state  planning,  and  other  emerging  features  of
1980s.  the  industrial  system  may  be unique  to China  but
the  broader  issues  raised  are relevant  in many
Evaluating  the  statistics  underlying  these  countiies.
reports  requires  an appraisal  of how  economic
reform  has affected  the  ability  of China's  stztisti-  Rawski  finds  considerable  evidence  of an
cal system  to measure  economic  performiance.  upward  bias  In  measures  of China's  real  indus-
Erroneous  informnation  about  the rate  and  pattern  trial  output  in the  past  decade.  The  issue  is not
of industrial  growth  could  distort  measures  of  whether  such  bias  exists  but  whether  its presnce
productivity  change  considered  to be central  substantially  alters  our  perception  of the rate  and
indicators  of the effectiveness  of Chinese  pattern  of Chinese  industrial  growth.
industrial  reformn.
To clajify  this issue  requires  investigating
Rawski  describes  the  statistical  materials  and  the extent  of possible  upward  bias.  This  in tumn
procedures  used  to provide  information  on  the  calls  for  an analysis  of possible  links  between
growth  of industrial  output.  He  investigates  upward  bias  - which  is itself  difficult  to ob-
sources  of bias  in the official  statistics  to indi-  serve  - and  other  economic  patterns  that  may
cate,  whenever  possible,  how  these  biases  be more  readily  measurable.
affected  reported  output  totals,  and  to appraise
the  impact  of adjustments  to reported  output
growth  on measures  of industrial  productivity.
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-1i-I. INMODUCnON
Data for recent years indicate an acceleration  of Chinese iwdustrial  growth from the annual
rates of approximately  ten percent recorded during the quarter-century  prior to the introductiun
of economic reform policies to figures approaching 15 percent annual growth during the mid-
and late 1980s.  Evaluation of the statistical materials underlying these reports requires an
appraisal of how economic reform has affected the capacity of  China's statistical system to
measure economic performance.  Since industrial output dominates China's national income
totals, possible  inaccuracies  in statistics  of industrial growth have the potential to affect overall
measures  of the size and structure of China's economy u  well as perceptions about the size,
structure  and growth rate of the industial sector itself.  Of particular concern is the possibility
that erroneous information  about the rate and pattern of industrial growth will distort measures
of productivity change, that we regard as central indicators of the effectiveness of industrial
reform efforts in China's economy.
The objective  of this paper is to describe the statistical  materials and procedures that stand
behind published  information  on the growth of industrial output, to investigate sources of bias
in the official statistics, to indicate, whenever possible, the quantitative  impact of these biases
on repcrted output totals, and to appraise the impact of adjustments  to reported output growth
on measures  of industral productivity..
The problems explored in this paper arise primarily from thea  interaction between the
growing complexity  of industrial organization  and market structure and a statistical network
designed to  collect information ior  the  pre-reform  system  of  industrial  olanning and
administration. Although  the specific  consequences  of decentalized decision-making,  growing
price flexibility, inflation, dual pricing systems, emergence of enterprises with few or no ties
to the system of state planning, and other emergent  features of the industrial system may be
unique  to China, the broader  issues raised by these  developments  would seem applicable  to other
socialist  economies  at various stages of maiket-oriented  reform programs.
II.  CONCErr  A  CATEORE  FOR  CNSE  INDUSRIAL  STsTIMMCS
Manipulation and interpretation of data portaining to Chinese industry (which includes
mining, manufacturing  and utilities) requires an appreciation of important concepts and data
categories used by Chinese statisticians.  State enterprises (puanmin suoyouzhif are those in
which the legal ownership of post-tax profits resides in  the hands of  some level of  the
government. Nearly all of China's largest enterprises belong to this category, which accounted
for 83.2 percent cif  indL  -ial output in 1978  and 59.7 percent in 1987 [Industry 1949-84,  p. 98
;TJNJ 1988, p. 311].  L.ollecti.-e  enterprises (iiti suoyouzhi are those in which this residuai
ownership  right resides with the ente-"ise  itself.  Residual  profit of private or individual (gc)
enterprise accrues to thcz owners.
-1-2  Now Fae Mm Ch*F.e  hu*oy  row?
The concept  of  'independent  accounting  units, (dulihesuan.giye)  refers to industrial
enterprises  that function  as separate  accounting  iltities. Statistics  for industrial  output  or input
(fixed  assets, worldng  capital,  labor)  often  refer exclusively  to independent  accounting  units,
which  contributed  85.8  percent  of national  industrial  output  (including  96.1 percent  in the state
and 86.4 percent  in the collective  sector)  to the 1988  gross  value  total [Jefferson,  Rawski,  and
Zheng,  Table  1; these  data  exclude  village-level  industry].  Industrial  activity  may  occur  within
non-industrial  units, as  when transport  companies  repair their own equipment  or  when
universities  or other  non-industrial  entitia operaie  factories  whose  accounts  are subsumed  within
their  owri. The output  value  of these 'non-independent  accounting  units' (feiduliheau giy
is incorporated  into output  totals  that include  all industrial  production  (rather  than only tha' of
independent  accounting  units).
The  coverage  of industrial  production  was  expanded  in 1984  to include  industrial  enterprises
managed  at and below the village level (formerly  descr.bed  as  nanaged  by the production
brigades  of rural  communes).  These  enterprises  were  previously  claisified  as part  of agricultural
rather  than  industrial  production  [Field  1988,  pp. 584-585].  Recent:  vubl  cations  have  begun  to
retroactively  incorporate  this category  into the industrial  totals  for previous  years, leading  to
apparent  inconsistency  with previously  published  statistics  (e.g. newly  published  labor figures
for collective  industry inclusive of  "village-managed'  enterprises are miuch  larger than
identically-labelled  employment  totals  published  in earlier  sources  not because  of any change  izi
underlying  statistics,  but merely  because  the "village-managed"  enterprises  were formerly
included  in the farm -ector).
Industrial  production  statistics  are valued  in terms  of 'current' or "constant'  prices. The
current  price value  of industrial  output  indicates  the value  of each  year's output  according  to the
market  prices of that year.  For th. vast majority  of products  that are sold in the year of
productioil,  output value at current prices is identical  with sales revenue. From this perspective,
the existence  of multiple  prices  for  individual  products  poses  no conceptual  or practical  difficulty
for Chinese  accountants  and statisticians.
Following  Soviet  example,  China's  wconomic  statistics  have  long  been  cs'culated  according
to "constant"  as well as current prices.  Constant  prices of 1952  were used for the period
1952-57;  1957  prices  were in force  from 1957-71;  national  statistics  for the years 1971-81  are
based  on 1970  prices;  and a 1980  price base  has been  in force  since 1981. Calculations  based
on 'constant' or fixed  prices are made  by multiplying  quantities  of output  by the relevant
"constant  p.ices,"  the latter being supplied to enterprise accountants  by  planning and
administrau've  agencies  of the Chinese  govemment.
It is important  to note that, as economic  reform  leads  enterprise  managers  to focus  more
closely  on financial  results  based  exclusively  on current  prices, the calculat<on  of output  value
at "constant"  prices becomes  increasingly  peripheral to enterprise objectives'. In the absence  of
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price indexes for industrial products, output value calculated at "constantu  prices becomes the
chief indicator of industrial growth and structure.  Intertemporal comparisons within a time
period spanned  by a single set of fixed prices pose no difficulty.  When the period of analysis
crosses from one to another fixed price base, as in como';ting growth between 1975 and 1985,
ratios of output totals in the bridging years 1957, 1971  o  ,981 are used to link figures across
time periods served by different  sets of fixed prices. If a calculation  crosses more than one such
gap,  e.g.  when comparing the levels of  industrial output in  1952 and  1987, a  series of
chain-linked  calculations  is used (see Field, JEC 1986, p. 509]  and the resulting time series is
described  as being based on "comparable*  (kmi) rather than "constant' (bbian)  prices.
III  CHN  S  INDusiAL  PEmFQFMANCE-SUMMARz  OF RECENr
OmaAL  DATA
Official  statistics  of China's industrial performance  during the past decade indicate a rapid
expansion of  output coupled with considerable structural change.  This  is the picture that
emerges from the summary figures presented in rables  1-4.
Part A of Table 1 reproduces data on the growth of overall  industrial output in constant
and in current prices for a comprehensive  industrial aggregate (designated 'Industry+')  that
includes enterprises managed at and below the village level.  Output totals for village-level
industry are shown separately; subtraction  of these figures from the global total generates an
output series (designated as  "Industry") restricted to  enterprises ope.ated at and above the
township  (xiang)  level.  Indexes  of output growth from a 1978 base derived from these figures
appear in Part B of Table 1; annual output changes for each category are derived in Part C.
These data indicate  a continuation  of the rapid and sustained  growth that has characLerized
Chinese industry throughout the history of the People's Republic of China. Using the d-aa at
constant  prices (labelled  GVIO), the  ate of output growth clusters around the 10 percent annual
level observed  over the long term in China.  If village industry is excluded, the average annual
growth  rate of OVIO  for 1978-87  is 10.4 percent. Even though village industry  reported annual
growth averaging  24.1 percent in real terms during 1978-R7,  the village component  is so small
that adding  its inclusion  in the total produces  only a marginal increase  in average  growth to 11.3
percent for 1978-87. This is important  because,  as will be seen below, there can be little dovbt
that the figures shown in Table 1 considerably  exaggerate the growth  of real output in the village
segment  of industry.
The figures reported in Table 1 indicate  a distinct acceleration of industrial growth during
the mid-1980s,  with reported real output growth approa.hing the 15 percent mark in 1983/84
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and 1986/87  and surpassing  15 percent  in 1984/85  even  without  the inclusion  of village-level
industries.
Data  showing  the level and growth  of industrial  output  at both  current  and constant  prices
can also provide  information  about changes  in the pdice  level for industrial  goods.  This is
particularly  important  because  Chinese  sources  give no systematic  information  on price trends
fer industrial  goods  until 1984/85;  branch  indexes  for prices  of industrial  goods  exist  only  ftwm
1985/86  [Chirna  Price  2 (1989):  59]. Implicit  price  indexets  fer industrial  output  appear  in Panel
A of Table 1.  These  data  reflect  the gradual  emergence  of inflationary  pressures  beginning  in
the mid 1980s following  yeaws  of near-stability  in industrial  prices.  Whether these data
acciiat'ly  reflect trends in prices paid for industrial  goods and/or received  by industrial
produce."  will be discussed  below.
Table  2 indicates  the brealkdown  of output  into several  ownership  ca.egories:  state-owned,
collective,  private, and other.  These figures  show that output from the c )llective  sector,
particularly  its sub-categories  of township  and vilage enterprises  (jointly described  by the tem
xiangzhen  Qa  , has  grown  much  faster  than  producton  in state  firms,  leading  to a rapid  decline
in the formerly  dominant  share  of state  firms  in total  output  value.
The output  totals  in Table  2 are divided  into two  major  sub-categories,  state  and coUective.
Additional  detail is given for two segments  of collective  industry, firms managw at the
township  (xi)  and  viLage  (M)  levels  within  the  coUective  sector. Since  coUective  enterprises
also  operate  in urban  areas, these  segments  do not exhaust  the entire  output  of China's  collective
industries.
Table  2 also  displays  output  data for a separate  category,  xian3gzbhCnqy,  which  is often
translIzted  as *township  and village enterprises' (abbreviated  lVE), even though  the term's
literal  meaning  is 'township  and market-town  enterprises.' These  data  are of interest  for two
reasons:  first, reported  output  has  grown  with  extreme  rapidity  in recent  years, so that the total
amounts  in 1987  to nearly  one-third  of national  gross  output. Furthermore,  the scope  of the
TVE data  remairs uncertain  for the period  beginning  in 1984. Prior to 1984,  the TVE output
data are almost  precisely  equal  to the sum  of output  value at fixed prices for township  and
village  enterprises. Beginning  in .984. however,  we find a large and growing  gap between
output  of township  and village  enterprises  and the much  higher  TVE  total. In addition,  the  price
basis of the TVE data reproduced  in Table 2 is not specified. We know that the data for
1978-83  represent  the sum of output  from township  and village enterprise  at constant  prices.
The  enormnous  growth  of the TVE category  starting  in 1983/84  suggests  that the.  figures  shown
in Column  E of Table 2 may represent  outpu.  valued  at current  rather than constant  prices.
Table  3 presents  information  on the  branch  structure  of gross  industrial  output  value  at 1980
prices. These  data, which  exclude  the minor  category  of non-independent  accounting  units  and
also  exclude  village  enterprise,  indicate  very little  change  in the importance  of major  branches
of Chinese  industry  during  the past  decade. This  is confirmed  by the  rank  correlation  coefficient
linking  the size  structure  of industrial  branches  for combined  state  and collective  industry  (PanelHow  FA M  Chha  induy Orow?  5
C of Table 2) in 1978 and 1987.2 The stabi!tv of br-rch stricture in both the state and
collective  segments  of industry  is a significant  factor  in analyzing  trends in reported  energy
productivity.  A stable  branch  structure  eliminates  the  ossibility  of raising  energy  productivity
by raising  the share  of industil  output  produced  in branches  with  'ow energy-intensity.
The figures  in Tables 1-3 arc based on the 'gross value of industrial  output," which
represents  the combined  total of enterprise  output  val6s inclusive  of materal costs. Table  4
contains  information  on the growth  of net industrial  output,  which is calcu1bted  by subtracting
the vaiue  of material  inpuu (minerals,  semi-fabricates.  energy  etc.) from  gross  output. The  net
value figures  are usually  rendered  only in current prices; when nret  output is presented  in
constant  price terms, the figures  are apparently  obtained  by multiplying  net output  in current
prices  by the ratio  of gross output  totals  Li constant  and current prices, which  is equivalent  to
"single deflation  rather  than tU  conceptually  preferable "double deflation" used id
contemporary  industrial  econormies,  in which separate  price indexes  are used to remove  the
impact of price change from gross output and from the intermediate  goods purchased  hy
industrial  enterprises.
The general  picture  emerging  from  shese  data  - rapid  growth,  acceleration  after 1983,  with
differentially  rapid  cxpansion  of the collective  sector  - parallels  the results  reported  in Tble  1.
The ratio  of net to gross  output  is nearly  identical  in the state  and collective  sectors. Following
decades  of near-constancv  in this ratio rsee  Industry  1949-84,  p. 41J, we now see a gradual  but
steady  decline  in the net output  ratio for both state  and collective  industry. There are several
possible  reasons  for this change:
- changing  product  mix within  individual  brmnches  of industry  (note  that stability  of branch
structure  precludes  change  in this area as a source  of decline  in net outpmt  ratios).
- changing  technology  and efficiency  in some branches relative to others.
- differential  inflation  of raw matcrials  prices  relative  to prices  of finished  products.
- changes  in the rate of double  counting  arising  fr..a response  to new  marketing  opportunities,
enlarged  ialization and inter-enterprise  division  of labor, expansion  of subcontracting,  and
growth  of joint production  and transprovincial  cooperation
Of  particular relevance here  is  the  possibility that  reform-induced  increases in
inter-enterprise  specialization  may have  raised  the,  owth rate of gross output  value  above  the
growth  rate of real industrial  product. This outcome  is not certain:  we lack  systematic  data  on
the ratio of interentcrprise  purchases  to total out(ut  (both  level and time-path  of this ratio)  for
2.  Braches 13 nd 14, nd also branch 11 ad 12 au combined  for  te  oalwlaton  becaus  they  amw  not  diMpiobshd
in th  1978 fiSue;  with 13 bmancr,  he rmak  ording  of 7 (including  the six lu  brarchu)  .identia  in 1978
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various types of erterprises.  In addition, some  units, isicluding  the large and widely publicized
Capital Iron and Steel Corporation, have taken advantage  of reform policies to increase rather
than reduce the degree of vertical integration, which has the opposite effect of causing gross
value to lag behind the growth of real output.
IV. SYMPTOMS  OF UJPWAp1  BLAS  iN CmNS  INDUSTRIAL  STATImCS
Careful inspection  of Chinese  statistical  publications  raises the possibility  that recent output
totals based on  wconstant prices* may exaggerate real outpit growth in the industriai sector.
Indications  of upward  bias in the constant-price  industrial  output totals for the past decade appear
from the following  types of materials:
- apparunt  mismatch  between growth of physical  output and output value in certain branches of
industry
- indicaLions  that township and village enterprise may confuse current and constant vices
- possible increases in the rate of double counting, which would have the effect of artificially
increasing the reported growth of gross output
- indications  that local govemments  may falsify  industrial  output statistics  to gain administrative
benefits attached to achievement  of lai ?  output totals.
- evidence that industrial output data do not adequately  reflect price increases  that have become
pervasive in recent years.
- indications  that reported gains  in energy  productivity  are unrealistically  large, especially  in the
fast-growing  machinery branch.
A. Mlsmatch  between Output and Value Data
In some cases, the reported growth of real output value appears to outrun the expansion  of
physical output for major products.  The most notable example of this occurs in the chemical
industry, for which relevant data appear  in Table 5.  These data show that the arithmetic  average,
of annual physical output growth for nine major commodities  lags behind the reported growth
of output value at  constant prices  for every year beginning with  1979/80.  The positive
difference between reported growth of real output value and production volume for major
commodities ranges from 2.56 percentage points in  1986/87 to  12.66 percentage points in
1984/85.
It is, of course, entirely possible for real output to outgrow physical production of major
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a variety of items within broad categories such as  'plastics."  Furthermore, the calculations
reported in Table 5 give identical  weight to each of the nine products.  On the other hand, the
size of some of the annual differentials  is troubling. Is it reasonable to anticipate that chemical
output could rise in real terms by 11 or 12 percent during years in which average output growth
of  major commodities amounted to  only 3.3 percent (1983/84) or  even declined slightly
(1984/85)? At the -ery least, these results suggest the possibility of upward bias in the value
data for one of China's larger industrial branches.  Figures for the machinery industry raise
similar, though less serious, issues.
B. Do Rural  Industries Adhere to Standard Accounting Regulations?
The extraordinary growth of township, village, and 'TVE'  enterprises noted in connection
with Table 1 raises questions  about the veracity of the underlying output reports.  In principle
each enterprise is expected to compile output values based on both current and constant prices
As reform causes managers to focus increasing attention on enterprise financial performance
enterprise leaders (and presumably  accountants  and statisticians  as well) pay growing attention
to current cash flows.  Despite  the complexity  arising from sales of similar products at multiple
prices, output  valued  at current prices is closely  related  to enterpnise  sales revenue, and therefore
appears  to  pose  little  conceptual or  practical difficulty even  for  the  inexperienced and
unsophisticated  accountants  available to small rural enterprises.
To calculate  gross output at fixed prices requires information  about the fixed (1980) price o
each  item produced. Industrial  ministries  publish large compendia  containing  relevant price lists.
Administrative  units at all levels a,e responsible  for passing on appropriate price information  to
enterprises  under their jurisdiction. While this system has functioned  smoothly  for many years
among large-scale enterprises in the staLe  sector, the recent explosive growth of collective
enterprise, especially in rural areas, raises the possibility that enterprises, their administrative
superiors  in township  or county  industrial  bureaus, local statistical  personnel, or all three group
may have failed to implement the system of calculation in constant prices that is of crucial
importance  for industrial output statistics even though it is of little or no interest to enterprise
personnel and perhaps to local government  officials as well.
China's  statistical rystem  operates according to  a  vertical  hierarchy  in  which  each
administrative  level compiles and processes statistical reports received from its immediate
subordinate  in the bureaucratic structure.  Thus national  agencies receive material prepared by
provincial  agencies, which  in turn rely on data  compiled  by municipal  or county  authorities, who
base their reports on  data from local enterprises.  This  means that statisticians at higher
administrative  levels cannot  easily evaluate  the quality  of the raw data underlying  the reports that
arrive on their desks, particularly  when, as in the case of rural industry, these  reports come from
literally thousands  of widely dispersed units.
Under these conditions,  it is entirely  possible  that data supposedly  based on fixed 1990 prices
could contain a substantial  component  based on (much higher) current prices.  With inflation,
substitution  of current for constant  prices imparts an upward  bias to the resulting  data.  The view8  How  Fas:  Has Chiae IndurJg  Grow,?
that failure  to implement  accounting  conventions  artificially  inflates  reported  output  growth,
especia.Uy  in the TVE sector, is widely  shared  within  the Chinese  economics  community. An
experienced  accountant  now working  with  a TVE machinery  producer  insists that even  in the
capital,  failure  to adhere  to statistical  regulations  is not uncommon  in the TVE sector;  in rual
areas, neglect  of these systems  is said to be widespread  (personal  communication,  May 1989].
Officials  of the State  Statistical  Bureau  [SSB]  agree  that output  data  from TVE enterprises  are
problematic,  that current  prices  are often  used to calculate  output  values  identified  as based  on
fixed prices, and that the output totals tend toward bias in the upward direction  (personal
communication,  May 1989;  May 1990]. A position  paper issued  by the SSB  in response  to
claims  that its figures  exaggerate  the rate of industrial  growth  in recent  years  points  specifically
to rural enterprise  as the chief source  of what the SSB  sees as a modest  upward  bias in its
estimates  of real industrial  growth [SSB  1988;  World  Herald 1988]. An extenal researcher
reports  that visits to Jiangsu  enterprises  in the xiangzenQive category  do indicate  extensive
mixing  of data in current and constant  prices, with enterprise  leaders finding  it difficult  to
explain  which  data  are based  on which  prices  (personal  communication,  July 1989]. A paper
prepared  by personnel  at China's  State  Statistics  Bureau  [SSB  1988]  reports  that industrial  units
at the township  (xiang level and above  are required  to submit monthly  reports of GVIO  at
constant  prices. The  small,  dispersed  and numerous  village-level,  jointly  operated  (at or below
villane  level)  and private  (gi)  enterprises  submit  only  annual  figures,  and these  are in current
rather  than  constant  prices. Provincial  and  local  statisticai  bureaux  then  adjust  these  submissions
on the basis of coefficients  derived  from sample  surveys  or surveys  of key enterprises. The
SSB's  position  paper  asserts  that these  procedures  remove  most,  if not  all of the shuifei  (literally
"water  content")  or upward  bias  from  the output  data  associated  with  village-level  industry.  The
SSB  also  points  out that figures  for these  units  are not included  in monthly  reports  of industrial
output  [See  World  Herald 1988  for a summary  of debate  on the "shuifen"issue].
Despite  this  explanation  from  the SSB,  examination  of available  data  confirms  the impression
that output  data for TVE enterprises,  especially  figures  said  to be based  on 1980  fixed  prices,
probably  overstate  the actual expansion  of real output, especially  during recent years of
extremely  rapid  enterprise  formation.  Prior  to 1985,  compilations  of  TVE data  carefully  specify
which  data  are based  on 1980  prices;  more  recent  publications  conspicuously  omit  any mention
of the price base  for output  data  pertaining  to 1985  and subsequent  years  r[VP, 1978-85;  TVP
1987;  TVP 1988;  TJNJ 1988,  p. 294. Note that Agriculture  1988  gives  TVE GVIO  for 1987
at 1980  prices  (p. 314)  using ;he  same  data  that appear  with no price attrbution  in TVP 1988,
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Several  specific  examples  can iUustrate  what appears to be considerable  inconsistency  in these
data:
Data for Beijing industrial enterprises for (million yuan):
1986  1987  Index
1986-100
1.  Gross output, 1980 prices (GVIO)
a. Including  village and sub-village
units  34858.07  39512.33113.3
b. Excluding  village and sub-village
units  32177.14  35723.28111.04
c. Difference: GVIO for vWillage
enterprise  2680.93  3789.05141.3
2.  Village & sub-village  output, current  2480.06  3382.27136.4
prices (CVIO)
3.  Ratio for village output: CVIO/GVIO  0.925  0.893
Source: Beijing 1988, pp. 255 (la-b),  364 (2).
These figures imply that village level industrial output is higher in constant than in current
prices.  But a decline in average prices for industrial output betwean 1980 and 1986 is most
improbable. These data also indicate that industrial prices continued to decline during 1986/87,
which is definitely  incorrect.
Shanghai  industrial output figures for 1987 (million yuan) raise further questions:
A  B  Ratio
1980  B/A
prices
1. Township  enterprises  5428  8122  1.496
2. Village enterprises  4361  5029  1.153
Sources: Shanghai  1988, p.  127 (A); TVP 1988, p. 26 (B)10  How Fat  Has Chine. lndwy  Grow?
The data marked 'A,"  identified  as based on 1980  prices, are much smaller than the figures
marked "b," which  appear initially  without  price attribution, but are also used to compile a total
described  as based  on 1980 prices in a separate  source (Agriculture 1988, p. 314 - this is a table
of 1987 gross output for township and village industry by province "at 1980 prices"; although
the line for Shanghai is blank, the national totals and data for other provinces are virtually
identical with figures in TVP 1988, p. 26, which makes no mention  of a price base].
Scattered  data for several provinces  imply improbable  increases  in labor productivity. GVIO
for Tianjin's village  enterprises reportedly  increased by 81 percent between 1985 and 1987  even
though employment  rose by only eight percent [Tianjin 1988, p.  111].  In Liaoning, reported
GVIO from township enterprises rose by 21 percent during 1986/87 despite a two percent
decline  in employment  [Liaoning 1988, p. 508].  In Heiongjiang, township  enterprises reported
real output growth of  15 percent during  1986/87 while employment fell by  one percent
(Heilongjiang 1988, p. 291].
The impression of widespread substitution  of current for constant price output figures is
confirmed  by Robert M. Field, who finds that 'a  large and growing number of provinces have
not distinguished  output [of village-level  industry] in current and constant prices. . . . in 1985
the output of village  and below-village  industry in current and constant prices were identi:al for
all provinces  [Field 1988, pp. 586-87, with emphasis  added].
C. Has the Rate of Double Counting Increased?
Measuring industrial output growth using information  about changes in the gross value of
industrial output can produce misleading  results if changes in industrial organization alter the
frequency  with which materials, components, and services are exchanged among enterprises.
Assuming  no change in real output, a trend in the direction of vertical integration (e.g. merger
of iron mines with steel plants)  will cause measured  output to decline (the sale of iron ore to the
steel mill disappears  from reported GVIO). A trend toward interenterprise  division  of labor, on
the contrary, will cause measured output to increase.
There are two reasons why one might expect the use of GVIO data to artificially inflate
measures  of industrial  output growth during the 1980s. First, industrial  reform has created  new
opportunities  for inter-enterprise  specialization  and division of labor.  Chinese economists  and
planners have long criticized the excessive vertical integration typical of Chinese industrial
operations.  Despite ample evidence that integration raises production costs, managers have
persisted in  building daerguan (large and complete) or  i  (smaUl  and  complete)
manufacturing  establishments  in order to limit  their dependence  on unreliable  external suppliers.
Economic  reform has increased the availability  and reliability of external suppliers for a wide
variety  of  commodities and  services.  There  are  many  reports  of  new  sub-contracting
an-angements,  inter-provincial  joint ventures and other institutional changes that point in the
direction of an increase in the overall ratio of inter-enterprise  transactions  to real output within
the industrial sector. [Note, however, the apparent  counterexample  of the Capital Iron and Steel
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reliance on external suppliers through such measures as  building its ov n power plant and
acquiring a fleet of ocean freighters.]
Even if there has been no trend toward inter-firm specialization  at existing enterprises, the
growing weight of  rural and collective enterprises in  the industrial output total has almost
certainly  brought a decline in average scale of industrial operations. This probably implies an
increase in specialization  simply  because small enterprises lack the capacity to achieve the high
degree of vertical integration typical  of China's larger industrial units.
We  thus have two  reasons for anticipating an increase in  the ratio of  inter-enterprise
exchange of materials and semi-fabricates  independent  of any shift in product mix or branch
structure  of industry.  Such a change  would build an upward bias into the output totals reported
in Table 1.  Such a change would also systematically  reduce the ratio of net to gross output
value, which is exactly what we see in Table 4.  Since several other factors also influence the
ratio of net to gross output, the downtrend in the ratic of net to gross output observed in Table
4,  although suggestive, is  not  sufficient to  demonstrate either  the  presence of  vertical
disintegration  or its possible impact on measures  of real output growth.
A  more promising approach would be to  look at  levels and changes in  the ratio  of
interenterprise  purchase of energy, materials  and semi-fabricates  to gross output value in various
subdivisions of  the  industrial sector.  For  example, the  industry-wide average  ratio  of
interenterprise  purchases to gross output at current prices (CVIO) [call this ratio IEP/CVIO0,
can be expressed  as a weighted  average  of distinct IEP/CVIO  ratios for large and small industry.
Thus:
[IEP/CVIO] = a[IEPl/CVI01]  +  (1-a)UEP2/CVI02]
where 1 and 2 indicate large and small-scale  industry and a is the share of the former  in national
industrial  output.
I hypothesize  that:
(1) the ratio (IEP/CVIO]  is considerably  larger for large than for small firms
(2) the weight attached to large firms, a, has declined irn  recent years
(3) economic reform tends to raise the ratio (IEP/CVIO]  for both large and smaii firms
It should be possible to use panel data from a enterprise surveys to investigate both the
level and time path of [IEPl/CVIOlj and IEP2/CVI02].  Together with data on the parameter,it
should  be possible to obtain some rough quantitative  idea of possible  bias in the output figures
arising from changes in industrial organization.?
3.  Wdiliam  Byrd observes  that  the foregoing  discusion overloolk the pouible impat of changes  in the price  of materils
and  intemediate  goods relative  to the price  of final  producs; such changer  might be systeuailcaUy  different  for large
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D. Do Local  Authoritles  Falsify  Industril Output  Data?
Well-informed  statistical  personnel  report the existence  of incentives  for exaggeration  of
industrial  output growth by local govenments in some regions of China.  In Jiangsu,  for
example,  municipalities  that  surpass  threshold  levels  of industrial  output  (e.g. 1  billion  yuan)  are
granted  special  privileges  in the form of exemption  from  certain types  of regulation  (e.g. direct
access to provincial  funds vs. application  through  county offices).  Falsification,  if extant,
presumably  taces  the form of inflating  gross  rather  than  net output  [note  that the former  can be
easily  inflated  by anranging  exchange  of materials  or semi-fabricates  anong producers  of similar
commodities].  If so, falling  ratios  of net to gross  output  will  be typical  of entities  with  inflated
gross  output  totals. Unfortunately,  there are many  other factors  influencing  this ratio, so that
falsification  might  easily  escape  detection,  especially  if the amounts  are small  relative  to local
and national  totals.
At the same  time, other enterprises  or localities  may  conceal  some  portion  of their  actual
production  in the hope of avoiding  taxes.
E. Industrial Output Data Accurately  Reflect  Recent Inflation Experience?
After decades  of considerable  price stability,  China  has experienced  growing  inflationary
pressures  during the 1980s.  Since Chinese  price index compilation  has previously  focused
almost  exclusively  on consumer  prices,  the impact  of recent  inflation  on industrial  prices  is not
easily  discerned. The only systematic  effort to monitor  trends in industrial  prices appears  to
come from the State Price Bureau, which  now surveys  price conditions  in several  thousand
industrial  enterprises  and uses the resulting  data to compile  indexes  of ex-factory  prices for
industrial  products as  well as purchase  prices for major raw materials,  fuels, and power
[personal  communication,  May 1989]. Summary  figures  for 1984/85  and more  comprehensive
results,  including  price indexes  for 15 industrial  branches  and purchase  price  indexes  for eight
classes  of materials  appear  in the Bureau's  journal rChia Pnricc  2 (1989):  pp. 59-60].
These figures  confirm that industry  has experienced  the inflationary  trend reported  for
urban  consumer  goods, Annual  increases  for  ex-factory  prices  averaged  8.7 percent  in 1984/85,
3.8 percent  in 1985/86,  7.9 percent  in 1986/87  and well over 10 percent  during  the first  eight
months  of 1988  [China  Price  2 (1989):  59]. Price  increases  for materials,  fuel, and power  were
substantially  larger in each year [ibid., 60].  The influence  of commercial  intermediaries
(including  government  agencies),  in the inflationary  process  is visible  if we compare  trends  in
ex-factory  prices of  mining  products and raw materals" (these  categories  appear  not to
overlap)  with trends in purchase  prices for wall  raw materials"  (percent  increases  over the
previous  year):How  Fan Hu  Ouaw  hmaaty  1r
Ex-Factory  Prices  Purchase  Prices
Mining  Raw  All Raw Materials
Products  Materials
1985  108.8  110.9  118.0
1986  100.6  107.5  109.5
1987  114.1  106.9  111.0
Aug.1988  108.8  117.8  123.9
Source:  China  Price 2 (1989):  59-60.
Profitable  intermediation,  whether  by state agencies  or by legitimate  or illegal private
enterprise  (sometimes  involving  persons  with official  connections)  is an important  componen
of the "official  speculation'  (guandao)  widely  reported  in the Chinese  press.  Beijing's  large
Yanshan  Petrochemical  Company  reportedly  "sold almost all their products to the State at
official  low  prices"  only  to discover  that 'most of their  products'  users  paid much  higher  market
prices"  for the same  materials  [China  Daily 6-3-1989,  p. 1].
Although  inflation  of industrial  prices  seems  to have  acclerated in recent  years, substantial
price  increases  certainly  occurred  prior to 1984/85.  Data  in Table  6 show  a rising  trend  for  coal
prices  paid by electric  power  plants  beginning  as early as 1978/79. Data for the construction
industry  show  a consistent  pattern  of rising building  costs from the stat  of annual  time seIes
data  in 1978  [TJNJ  1988,  p. 590]. Since  these  figures  exclude  land costs,  it would  appear  that
rising  costs of construction  mateials, which  prompted  complaints  in the Chinese  press  during
the late 1970s,  also date back  to this period. Interview  data collected  by foreign  reserchers
give a strong impression  of rising machinery  prices during the late 1970s  and early 1980s
[personal  communication].
Information  on prices  paid by power  plants  for coal  illustrates  the possible  inconsistency
between  information  about  inflation  and the price  changes  implied  by industrial  output  statistics.
The  electric  power  industry  is dominated  by large, stateowned  enterprises. It seems  reasonable
to assume  that thermal  power  plants  obtain  the bulk of their coal  requirements  through  planned
allocations  at low official  prices,  and that they enjoy  considerable  protection  from the "official
profiteers' attacked  in the Chinese  press.  This would  imply  that, relative  to otber consumers
of coal,  power  plants  are somewhat  insulatid  from  inflationary  pressures,  and that trends  in their
coal  costs  should  unmad  the average  rise in coal  prices  for the entire  economy.
Data  reproduced  in Table  6 show  that averagc  coal  costs in China's  power  industry  havi
risen  steadily  since 1978. The index  of coal  costs,  which  should  represent  an underestimate  o
the aveage rise in coal  prices,  shows  an increase  of 88.9  peracnt  between  1978  and 1987. The
implicit  price indicator  calculated  from gross  output  at cunrent  and constant  prices  for the coal
industry,  however,  shows  much  smaller  increases  of 66.7 percent  for the state sector  and 48.9
percent  for the (much  smauller)  collective  mining  sector. These  data  lead to the conclusion  that
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constant  (GVIO)  prices  probably  understate  changes  in the sales  price of coal received  by the
producers. Specifically,  we anticipate  that, Jf t indicates  time, the ratio of annual  output  data
CVIO(t)/GVIO(t)  is too low.
Inconsistency  among  several  data series  raises  the question  of which  is most likely  to be
in error.  The conclusion  that the ratio CVIO(t)/GVIO(t)  is probably  too small  is based  on the
judgment  that figures  for average  coal  cost, which  come  dirctly from  records  of financial  and
material  transactions  maintained  by large, well-establishri  units, are less subject  to distortion
than ynthetic  calculations  of output  value. If the distortion  is contained  in the output  figures,
the previous  discussion  suggests  the constant-price  figures (GVIO)  as the probable  locus of
difficulty. 4 This reasoning  is not foolproof,  but it appears  that the most likely  explanation  of
inconsistency  between  coal costs to the power  industry  and the 1VTO  and CVIO  data relating
to coal production  is that the series  of output  value  at fixed  w  faster than the real
value  of industrial  output  in the coal  industry.
Inconsistency  between  information  about  inflationary  patterns  and the  price  indexes  implicit
in China's  industrial  output  statistics  is not  limited  to the coal  industry.  More  general  difficulties
become  evident  when  one compares  the implicit  price  indexes  derived  from output  data  for the
state  and collective  segments  of industry.
Despite  the progress  of economic  reform, markets  for Chinese  indistrial output  remain
heavily  regulated. Many  firms are obliged  to sell substantial  portions  of their output  at low
controlled  prices. Even  when  firms  are allowed  to sell  output  at 'negotiated'  or "imarket'  rather
than  plan  prices, they  encounter  numerous  controls [Ishihara,  1989]. Government  agencies  set
maximum  prices, as when the State Price Bureau  issues 'upper price limits for means  of
production  outside  the plan," including  petroleum  products,  aluminum  ingots  and steel  products
[frice  Thcy  3 (1988):  51-53). Extra-plan  sales  of steel  and non-ferrous  metal  products  are
also restricted  to designated  commodity  exchanges  [rinc  TheoX 5 (1988):  p. 57].  These
measures  are clearly  designed  to contain  and restrict  the rise of industrial  prices. "law-boning,"
or personal  official  advice  intended  to limit  price increases,  has the same  effect.
Each of these measures  is directed  primarily  toward,  and applied  most forcefully  to the
activities  of large, stateowned enterprises.  Under conditions  of excess  demand  in which
govemment  struggles  to prevent  prices from rising to market-clearing  levels, it is difficult  to
doubt  that small, widely  dispersed  collective  enterprises  encounter  less restriction  on product
pricing  than large, highly  visible  firms in the state sector. For this reason, there is a strong
presumption  that the rate of price  increase  for commodities  produced  in the collective  sector  will
tend to outpace  comparable  inflation  rates  for similar  products  in the state  sector.
4.  Itis also  pouible that  riing makups  by cooomeil  intennsdiarim  have  widenod  Xw  p berwes tbe primes oseved
by ooal  produm  and the  price  paid by  oal user  for the powing  porton of  astha  oocur oute  X  pia
frmwork.  However, Jcfkon.  RAwWi nd Zheng find no evidence  of A genral ris  in markups  for industrial
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Unfortunately,  the price indexes derived from statistics of industrial output value point in
the opposite direution. Table 7 shows that implicit price increases reported for the collective
sector fall short of comparable  state sector data in every year since 1978.  Typically, reported
inflation is  the  coUective sector is  half or  less of  ieported  intlation in  the  state sector.
Comparison  of annual inflation rates for state and collective industrial ou.put witiin the same
branch produces the same result.  Between 1978  and 1987, nearly three fourths of the instances
where comparable data  exist  (91 of  126 cases;  9  cases are  excluded because  of  data
incomparability),  the implicit inflation is higher in the state sector.  In recent years, this result
is even clearer: during 1984/87, we find 35 instances  of higher implicit branch price increase;
in the state sector compared with only 8 instances of higher price increases in the collective
sector (two items are discarded as incomparable)S
These conclusions  are not acceptable, particularly since data from the coal sector suggest
that price indicators extracted from the reported growth of industrial output in constant and
current prices already understate  industrial inflation for the state sector.  The figures shown in
Table 7 suggest that output statistics for the entire collective sector, which now accounts for
nearly one-third of industral production, systematically  understate the impact of inflation.  If
this is true, the most likely mechanism  is that rorted  output yalue at fixed prices forChir1.
collective industries Systematically  overstates the  growth of  real out=  during the  1980s,
particularly in recent years of strong inflationary  pressures.
F. Are Reported  Gains in Energy Productivity  Unrealistically  Large?
Data reproduced  in Table 8 indicate  that China's industries achieved very substantial  gains
in energy productivity  during the early 1980s. These figures, which exclude village industries
(see below) indicate annual gains averging  6.7 percent in real output per ton of standard coal
equivalent.  This  compares well  with  figures  for  energy  productivity in  mining  and
manufacturing  for major industrial nations  showing average annual productivity  growth of 2.6,
3.4 and 7.0 percent for West Germany, the  United States and Japan respectively during the
period 1973-86.'  If  correct, these figures indicate a  highly effective response to  energy
shortages  within Chinese industry, which accounts  for more than two-thirds  of China's energy
consumption.
Many observers have noted that China's energy prices are much lower, in relative terms,
than comparable  prices in cther nations and in the world market, and also that domestic  energy
prices have not risen in paralle with global market trends.  Despite the inflexibility  of official
prices, the data in Table 6, showing  that avemge  coal prices paid by thermal power plants nearly
S.  ..ece  commenu am based  on a workshea  DEFLATE2.wkl.
6. Based  on a scpare  workshee  NENOCOMP.wkl,  which  is not  included  in this paper.16  How  Fwat  Mar  Chine Irdmrbv  Grow?
doubled  between  1978  and 1987,  imply  still  larger  increases  in the mumsinal  prices  paid  even  by
high-priority  energy  consumers  in China's  industrial  economy,
Even  where energy prices have not risen steeply,  reports suggesting  widespread  energy
rationing  point to the binding  nature of energy constraints  across much of Chinese  energy.
Under  these  conditions,  managers  seeling  higher  financial  returns  will  impute  a high  opportunity
cost  to inessential  energy  consumption  even  if direct  costs  are low. It thus  seems  reasonable  to
conclude that many Chinese managers feel intense pressure to  economize  on  energy
consumption.
Changes  in industrial  energy productivity  can be decomposed  into three components:
changes  in the branch  structure  of industry  that decrease  the reladve  weight  of energy-intensive
industries,  reductions  in energy  requirements  for producing  specific  commodities,  and changes
in the commodity  structure  of output  within  individual  branches  of industry. We have  already
seen  that Chinese  industry  experienced  no significant  change  in branch  structure  during  the past
decade  (Table  3).
Review of  Chinese publications,  which include numerous descriptions  of  physical
input-output  coefficients  related  to energy  consumption,  sugest only modest  gains  from  reduced
unit  energy  requirements  for specific  products. Electric  power  consumed  in producing  one ton
of crude  oil or raw  coal  increased  every  year  during  1980/85  (Energy  1986,  pp. 86, 504]. Coal
consumption  per  idlowatt  of power turned  out by large power plants or per ton of cement
produced  by major  plants  declined,  but by less than five percent [ibid.,  508, 527]. Since  the
share of output  coming from small plants, which are criticized for their excessive  energy
requirements,  has  risen  in many  branches,  the  potential  for major  growth  of energy  productivity
from  reduced  unit energy  requirements  for specific  products  seems  very limited.
This leaves  structural  change  within  individual  branches  of industry  as the main  locus  of
improved  energy productivity  for Chinese industry during 1980/85.  Tlhis  conclusion  is
problematic  because  substantial  intra-branch  restructunng  appears  limited  to a few branches  -
machinery,  chemicals,  and  perhaps  textiles. This  outcome  draws  attention  to the possibility  that
a portion  of the productivity  gains  repot.ed  in Table  8 may  be attrbutable  to measurement  error.
To explore  the possibility  of measurement  error, and also to investigate  the branch  pattern  of
cnange  ip.  sarmgy productivity,  we turn to an examination  of energy data for 15 branches  of
Chinese  industry  during  1980/85.
Table  9 pnsents energy  consumption  data  for 15  branches  during  1980/85. Panel  B uses
these figures  to derive annual  percentage  changes  in energy productivity  (GVIO/E,  where  E
represents  energy  consumption  in terms  of standard  coal) for 15 branches. These  data  conta
a number  of improbable  items:  can we believe,  for  example,  that energy  productivity  in food
processing  rose  by  27.3 percent  during  1984/85,  or that  energy  productivity  in machine-building
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We can investigate the consistency of the data for energy consumption (not shown) and
energy consumption  per unit of GVIO by extracting the implicit branch figures for GVIO and
comparing  them with GVIO  data from other sources. Tis  is done in Table 10, which uncovers
unacceptably  large discre)ancies for branches  9-14 in the 15-branch  clasification.  Fortunately,
data for the sectors that consume the largest quantities  of energy, namely metallurgy, power,
chemicals, building materials, and machine-building,  are not involved  in these inconsistencies.
Table 11 presents a recalculation  of EIGVIO  and of annual percentage changes in GVIO/E
for 1980/85  based on published  branch data for E and on information  from other sources giving
branch  time series  of GVIO. These revised  data show fewer improbable  entries (readers should
ignore the problems  in branches 13 and 14, which should  be merged in a future recalculation).
These results suggest  that, among the major energy users, machinery, chemicals  and, to a lesser
extent, metallurgy, have achieved considerable success in raising energy productivity, while
electricity  and building materials have recorded much smaller gains.
The veracity of these data, however, depend substantially  on the accuracy of GVIO data
for chemicals  and machinery  - exactly the sectors for which comparison of physical production
and value data indicate the possibility of upward bias in  the  value totals.  Since energy
productivity  in these sectors, alone among the major using branches, rises much faster than the
reported national avenge,  this dependence is considerable.  Removal of  the chemical and
machinery  branches, which contribute over half of the overall energy savings attained during
1980/85  (Table 16) reduces the cumulative  growth of energy productivity  during 1980/85  from
28.6 percent to 17.3 percent (Table 16, Panel 1).  If we were to assume that the growth of
energy productivity  in machinry  and chemicals  was limited to this lower amount, rather than
the much larger figures shown in Tables 1lB and 16, the average annual growth rate of the
entire industrial  sector (excluding  village enterprises)  during 1980/85  would be reduced by two
percentage points, from 10.8 to 8.8 percent annually. 7
Note, however, that the World Bank anticipates  large reductions in unit consumption of
electricity in  the chemical brarich because of  slow relative growth of  synthetic ammonia,
"dramatic  reductions' in unit power requirements  for synthetic  ammonia, and the international
trend  toward  reduced  power  intensity in  chemical manufacture (1985-A3,  pp.  47-49].
Furthermore, Chinese  specialists  regard the materials  contained  in Energy (1986]  as preliminary;
this book was never released to the general public.  However, it is my impression that data
issued in subsequent  publications  (notably Energy [1989]), will support similar results.
The importance of  energy issues and the major differences in  scale and  technology
separating  state and collective  industry makes  it important  to provide separate analysis  of energy
consumption in state and collective industry.  As far as I can determine, China's statistical
agencies  have made no effort to do this.  Industrial  census data giving energy consumption  for
7.  Thi  calculzion is based  on first  column of Table 2B, following  a separae  worksheg 'What  if Energy  Savings  ate
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state sector independent  accounting  units in  1980 and 1985 allow a trial calculation of energy
consumption and energy productivity  trends for collective  industry durinig  the period 1980/85.
NOTE: this can perhaps be extended to 1986 (using data in TJNJ 1988, pp. 424-436).
This is done in several steps:
(1) exanine energy  data for state sector independent  accounting  units divided  into 40 branches;
(2) collapse data for 40 branches into 15 branches;
(3) obtair. estimates  of collective  sector energy consumption  in 15 branches for 1980 and 1985
by subtracting  energy consumption  by state-sector  firms from the national totals underlying
Table 9.
(4) calculate changes  in energy  productivity  for the collective  sector using derived or published
figures of branch OVIO.
Energy data for 40 branches of industry in 1980 and 1985 are reproduced in Table 12,
where I find no significant  inconsistency  between implied and publisned  data for branch GVIO
(readers should ignore the discrepancy  for branch 7, which is trivial in size, and in the residual
branch 40). Again, we see substantial  increases  in energy productivity  over 5 years; again, these
gains depend crucially  on reported increases for a small number of branches that consume  large
amounts  of energy  and report above-average  productivity  gains: chemicals  (branch 26); machine
manufacture  (branch 35).
These data can also be used to compute  the 'energy savings' arising from the presence  of
lower unit energy consumption coefficients in  1985 than existed in  1980.  As before, two
sectors, machinery  and chemicals, dominate  the calculated  savings, accounting for 45 percent
of the total amount (Table 16).  If we were to assume that the path of energy productivity  in
these two branches palleled  the (considerably  slower) gains reported for other branches of
industry, the average  annual growth rate for state industry during 1980/85  would decline  by one
percentage  point, from 8.2 to 7.2 percent.'
Table 13 reports the result of calculations  that collapse  data for 40 state-sector  branches  into
15 branches and derive figures for changes in energy productivity  for the 15 branches between
1980  and 1985. The transition from 40 to 15 braiiches  is incomplete  because it is not possible
to make adjustments  for 18 sub-branches  (as is done in a separate worksheet, DATA87.wkl);
the discrepancy,  however, is not large. Energy productivity  for 15 branches is calculated  in two
ways: first, using GVIO data that is derived from the 40-branch figures shown in Table 12; and
second, using data from other sources that give GVIO for independent  accounting units in the
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state sector according to  the  15-branch classification in  use before 1986.  Although the
differences  between the two sets of calculations  are not large (again, note that branches 13 and
14 should be merged), the latter figures are preferable.  Here again we see the importance of
machinery  and chemicals, which are the only large branches reporting above-average  growth of
energy productivity.
Table 14 presents trial estimates of energy consumption and productivity change for 15
branches of collective industry during 1980/85.  In Panel  1 of Table 14, branch  clergy
consumption and branch GVIO are  derived as residuals from the  national totals and  the
state-sector  figures presented above.  Comparison  of GVIO figures derived in this manner with
published  data showing branch GVIO for collective-sector  independent  accounting units at and
above the &ing  level (recall that the basic energy consumption data for  1980/85 appear to
exclude  village-level  industry), reveals massive  inconsistency. We therefore focus our attention
on Panel 2 of Table 14, in which branch energy consumption  for collective  industries  is derived
as a residual, and then combined  with published  data on collective  sector branch output to obtain
productivity  figures.
Scrutiny  of these results yields the following  observations:
1.  There is a major inconsistency  in data for the electric power industry, in which data for
the state sector alone indicate much larger energy  consumption  in both 1980 and 1985  than
for the entire power branch!  As a result, the calculation reported in Table 14 indicates
large negative energy consumption  in the collective  power industry for both years.  Less
worrisome  discrepancies  appear in branches 4 (in which the collective  sector minute)  and
14 (probably reflecting need to merge with branch 13).
2.  Output value per unit of energy consumed (partial energy productivity) appears much
higher in the collective  than in the state sector.
3.  If valid, the foregoing observation appears to be  the result of  differences in  output
structure  rather than superior  coUective  productivity  on a branch-by-branch  basis. Energy
consumption  per unit of real output  by collective  producers is markedly  higher in branches
1, 6 and 9 (metallurgy, machinery, food processing) than in the state sector.  Partial
energy productivity  seems  to favor collective  firms in branches 7, 8, 10, and 12 (building
materials, forestry, textiles, leather), of which only 7 and 10 are major branches.  In 7,
the quality of  small-plant  output is far inferior to the state-sector norm [World Bank
1985-A3,  p.  17].  Partial energy productivity is similar for state and collective firms in
branches 5 (chemicals  - here the comparison  is blurred by major differences in product
mix) and 11; the comparison  is obscured by data problems for the remaining sectors.
4.  Cumulative  gains in energy productivity  for the collective  sector, summarized  in Table 15,
are far larger than comparable  gains for the state sector in every significant  branch except
building materials (ignore the confused and minor branches 13-15).  In most cases, the
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This last  result seems  quite improbable,  and once  again  calls attention  to the possibility  of
upward  bias in available  measures  of real output  growth  fnr the collective  sector.
A  final point about e'nergy data.  There is  a  variety of  material suggesting  that
overestimates  of output  growth  may  not be confined  to TVE  enterprises  and the  collective  sector.
Some  examples:
Energy  consumption  per 10,000  yjan of output  in Beijing's electric  power industry  dropped
from 4.62 to 4.07 tons of standard  coal during 1986/87,  indicating  a rise of 13.6  percent in
energy  productivity,  even  though  coal  consumption  per kldowatt-hour  of power  produced  did not
change  [Beijing  1988,  pp. 291, 372].
Nationally,  the electric power industry reports a  7.5  percent drop in unit energy
requirements  during 1980/85  (Table 11-B)  even though  coal consumption  per kwh for large
power  plants  (6000  kw and above),  which  produce  a large share  of total power  output,  declined
by only 3.6 percent  during  the same  period  (Ene  gy 1986,  p. xxx].
The  chemical  industry  reports  thai  energy  productivity  increased  by 12.6  percent  in 1984/85
(Table  11-B). During  the same  perio:'. !owever,  8 of 16 unit energy  coeffici:nts  for major
plants actually  increased! The remainiig eight coefficients  declined  by an average  of 5.8
percent.  Only 1 of  16 coefficients  for major plants declined  by more than the reported
industry-wide  average  (Energy  1986,  p. 87].
The building  materials  industry  reported  a 20 percent rise in energy  productivity  during
1980/85,  but unit energy requirements  at major  plants  decline  by a maximum  of 6.3 percent
[Energy 1986, p.  88]
Reported  energy  productivity  in coal  production  improved  in every  year  but 1984/85  (Table
l 1-B),  showing  a cumulative  gain of nearly  five  percent. Yet data for major  enterprises  show
a rising treiid  for unit energy requirements;  power consumption  per ton of raw coal rises in
every  year [Energy  1986,  pp. 86, 493-500]
V. CONCLUSIONS
This survey  reveals considerable  evidence  pointing  to the existence  of upward  bias in
measures  of China's  real industrial  output  during  the  past  decade. The  issue  is not  whether  such
bias exists,  but whether  or not its presence  substantially  alters our perception  of the rate and
pattern  of Chinese  industrial  growth.
To clarify  this issue  requ  res an investigation  of the possible  extent  of upward  bias. This  in turn
will require an analysis of possible  links between  upward bias, which itself is difficult  to
observe,  and other economic  patterns  that may be more readily  measurable.How Fait Has  Ch;na  Irdalwvy Grown?  21
TABLE  1:  ALL  INDUSTRY
A. Level of Industrial  Gross Output, 100 million  yuan
Year  GVIO  GVIO  GVIO  CvIO  Price  Annual %
Iadusuy  Viage  Industzy  +  Indus  +  Iadex  Inflazion
Data in 1970  prices
1978  4231  161  4392  4237  96.47
1979  4591  184  4775  4681  98.03  1.62
1980  4992  222  5214  5155  98.87  0.85
1981  5199  241  5440  5400  99.26  0.40
Data in 1980  prices
1981  5178  246  5424  5400  99.56  N.A.
1982  5577  277  5854  5811  99.26  -0.29
1983  6164  325  6489  6461  99.57  0.30
1984  7030  460  7490  7617  101.70  2.14
1985  8295  661  8956  9717  108.50  6.69
1986  8979  841  9820  11194  113.99  5.06
1987  10307  1150  11457  13813  120.56  5.76
B. Index  of Output  Growth, 1978- 100
1979  108.51  114.28  108.72  110.48
1980  117.99  137.89  118.72  121.67
1981  122.88  149.69  123.86  127.45
1982  132.35  168.55  133.68  137.15
1983  146.28  197.76  148.18  152.49
1984  166.83  279.91  171.04  179.77
1985  196.85  402.21  204.52  229.34
1986  213.08  511.74  224.25  264.20
1987  244.59  699.77  261.63  326.01
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TABLE  1:  ALL  INDUsTRy  (continuation)
Year  GVTO  GVIO  GVIO  CVIO  Price  Annual  %
Industry  Village  Industry +  Indus +  Index  Inflation
C. Annual Output Increase  Over Previous Year (percent)
1979  8.51  14.28  8.72  10.48
1980  8.73  20.65  9.19  10.13
1981  4.17  8.56  4.33  4.75
1982  7.70  12.60  7.93  7.61
1983  10.52  17.33  10.85  11.18
1984  14.05  41.54  15.43  17.89
1985  17.99  43.70  19.57  27.57
1986  8.24  27.23  9.65  15.20
1987  14.79  36.74  16.6  23.40
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TABLE  2:  BREAKDOwN  OF GROSS  INDUSRAL OUTPUT  AT CONSTANT  PRICES
DATA EXCLUDE  VILLAGE-LEYEL  UNITS
B  C  D  E  F  G  H
Total  State  Collective Sector Categories  Xiang
Total  Xiang-A  Xiang-B  CunlDui  zhen
1978  4231  3416  814  212  224  161  385
1979  4591  3720  871  234  241  184  424
1980  4992  3928  1034  280  286  222  509
1981  5199  4028  1131  310  321  241  579
1981  5178  4054  1089  323  332  246  579
1982  5577  4340  1193  354  369  277  646
1983  6164  4748  1354  413  432  325  757
1984  7030  5171  1758  539  575  460  1245
1985  8295  5840  2301  742  799  661  1827
1986  8979  6201  2637  948  2413
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TABLE  3: BRANCH  STRUCTURE  OF GVIO AT 1980 PRICES  (PERCENT)
A. Branch Structure for State  Enterprisea  (SOE)
Br  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987
1  11.80  11.99  11.81  11.08  10.96  10.73  10.77  10.51  10.58  10.52
2  4.82  4.79  4.87  4.86  4.82  4.59  4.45  4.66  4.61  4.59
3  4.26  3.99  3.61  3.42  3.36  3.25  3.15  2.99  2 83  2.65
4  8.01  7.81  7.49  7.16  6.83  6.69  6.68  6.52  6.43  6.37
5  11.81  11.60  11.92  12.02  12.41  12.44  12.43  11.70  12.61  12.36
6  21.12  21.34  20.26  18.55  19.86  21.34  23.12  24.58  25.86  25.51
7  2.75  2.69  2.67  2.50  2.57  2.56  2.59  2.81  3.45  2.70
8  1.89  1.86  1.78  1.73  1.67  1.56  1.48  1.24  1.14  1.13
9  12.44  12.65  13.01  14.30  14.58  13.86  13.52  13.19  12.99  12.99
10  13.83  14.20  16.11  18.10  16.67  16.78  15.56  15.19  14.56  14.42
11  1.04  0.51  0.54  0.60  0.56  0.55  0.56  0.56  0.52  0.53
12  0.00  0.53  0.58  0.63  0.57  0.52  0.48  0.47  0.48  0.46
13  3.07  3.18  3.18  2.93  1.44  1.43  1.46  1.48  1.60  1.64
14  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.48  1.44  1.42  1.48  0.46  0.47
iS  3.14  2.85  2.17  2.12  2.24  2.26  2.32  2.62  1.89  3.67
Sum  100.00  00.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00
B. Branch  Structure for CoUective  Enterprises  (COE)
Br  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  198b  1987
1  1.97  2.28  2.34  2.17  2.32  2.47  2.54  2.89  3.39  3.56
2  0.11  0.15  0.17  0.21  0.23  0.25  0.22  0.20  0.20  0.20
3  2.27  2.12  1.94  1.87  1.93  1.94  1.92  1.64  1.63  1.42
4  0.12  0.13  0.13  0.11  0.11  0.14  0.13  0.15  0.18  0.21
5  10.94  10.74  10.76  10.93  11.45  11.94  11.26  10.94  11.17  11.30
6  36.07  34.84  32.63  30.38  30.68  31.55  30.95  33.27  32.83  33.07
7  8.37  8.63  8.32  7.91  8.57  8.46  8.17  7.50  8.89  7.51
8  2.55  2.73  2.72  2.64  2.71  2.52  2.33  2.23  2.85  2.28
9  2.96  3.39  3.70  4.39  4.69  4.71  5.04  4.96  5.37  5.46
10  7.90  8.58  10.04  11.92  12.08  12.26  16.02  16.3  15.76  15.96
11  11.28  9.36  10.49  10.96  9.59  9.22  8.44  7.10  6.39  6.22
12  0.uO  2.35  2.94  3.05  2.58  2.34  2.09  2.08  2.17  2.20
13  5.48  5.06  5.35  5.53  5.26  4.61  1.02  1.01  2.45  2.61
14  0.00  1.02  1.02  1.06  1.08  1.08  4.18  5.13  3.62  3.94
15  9.97  8.61  7.43  6.88  6.74  6.50  5.71  4.59  3.11  4.07
100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00
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TABLE  3: BRLNCH  STIrUCT1z o  GVIO AT  1980 PRiCzS  (PEcCNT) (coaninuatin)
C. Branch Structure  for SOE and COE Combinod  (peamt)
1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987
1  9.99  10.21  9.90  9.18  9.07  8.84  8.69  8.39  8.49  8.37
2  3.9S  3.94  3.92  3.86  3.82  3.61  3.38  3.43  3.33  3.23
3  3.91  3.6S  3.27  3.08  3.0S  2.96  2.84  2.61  2.48  2.27
4  6.56  6.40  6.00  5.6S  5.36  5.22  5.02  4.7S  4.61  4.47
5  11.65  11.45  11.69  11./9  12.20  12.33  12.14  11.49  12.19  12.03
6  23.87  23.81  22.76  21.08  22.22  23.63  25.10  27.00  27.88  27.35
7  3.79  3.78  3.81  3.65.  3.87  3.88  4.00  4.11  S.03  4.19
8  2.01  2.02  1.97  1.92  1.89  1.77  1.70  1.51  1.64  1.48
9  10.70  10.96  11.13  12.18  12.42  11.81  11.38  10.91  10.77  In).66
10  12.74  13.17  14.89  16.78  1S.67  15.77  1S.68  1S.50  14.91  14.19
1  1  2.92  2.13  2.55  2.82  2.53  2.49  2.55  2.38  2.23  2.29
12  0.00  0.86  1.06  1.1S  1.01  0.93  0.89  0.92  0.97  1.00
13  3.52  3.53  3.62  3.49  2.28  2.1S  1.34  1.35  1.85  1.94
14  0.00  0.19  0.21  0.23  1.39  1.36  2.12  2.49  1.38  1.54
15  4.39  3.91  3.23  3.14  3.22  3.21  3.17  3.16  2.24  3.79
100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  99.99  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00
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TABLE  4: NET  OUTrT  AT  CURRENT  PRICES  (100 MILON  YUAN)
INDEPENDENT  ACCOUNTiNG  UNITS,  EXCLUDING  VILAGE ENTERRLSEs
Total  State  Colective  Xiang
1978  1358
1979  1486
1980  1648  1319  322  114
1981  1690  1317?  342
1982  1774  1373  369
1983  1930  1501  415
1984  2246  1721  506  183
198S  2767  2058  679  247
1986  2979  2178  763  296
1987  3488  2530  894  354
Source:  Rawali  wntten  files  GVIO-tables.
Net output ratio
(baed on CVIO data for independent  accounting  unit  - not shown)
Total  State  Colective
1978
1979
1980  0.35  0.351  0.348
1981  0.344  0.341  0.337
1982  0.336  0.332  0.334
1983  0.332  0.332  0.332
1984  0.333  0.340  0.314
1985  0.329  0.336  0.313
1986  0.316  0.322  0.301
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TABLE  5: CEHsUcAL  INDurrRy
Averag  % Change  Differmtial
Perew Change  GVIO,P80  Growth  of
physical  output  OVIO, percentage
Nine Products
1979  13.51  7.01  -6.60
1980  7.85  10.77  2.92
1981  -4.06  4.66  8.72
1982  7.30  11.43  4.13
1983  8.33  12.46  4.13
1984  3.30  12.04  8.74
1985  1.05  11.61  12.66
1986  5.77  12.17  6.40
1987  14.S2  17.C8  2.56
Source: 1988  TJNJ, pp. 34546 for commodity  dat;  OVIO  dat aro from Indusry  1988, p. S4.
Thea  figtuem  ezcluds villge-level onprises.  Figures for 1978-80  woro converted from 1970
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TAILE  6:  ALTmENATrVE  DATA  To MEASURe  finLATION  IN
THE COAL INDUSTRY
CVIO/OVIO  Cumulatve
A  B  C  Annual Price  Price Chang
Costiton  % change  Price  Change  From  Since  1978
Sid Coal  from  pan  Indx  Pat Year  Percet
Y/ton  yur  1978-100  SOB  COE  Power
Plats
1971  43.77  NA.  100.00
1972  38.99  -10.92  89.08
1973  39.86  2.23  91.07
1974  43.10  8.13  98.47
1975  44.17  2.48  100.91
1976  44.70  1.20  102.12
1977  44.80  0.22  102.35
1978  42.06  -6.12  96.09
1979  44.93  6.82  102.65  14.32  4.44  6.82
1980  46.18  2.78  105.51  7.25  1.38  9.80
1981  47.71  3.31  109.00  2.56  5.05  13.43
1982  55.40  16.12  126.57  1.66  4.99  31.72
1983  61.32  10.69  140.10  1.23  5.41  45.79
1984  64.01  4.39  146.24  2.71  3.82  52.19
1985  69.21  8.12  1S8.12  13.68  9.83  64.5S
1986  7S.21  8.67  171.83  5.13  2.01  78.82
1987  79.46  5.65  181.54  4.94  3.97  88.92
Source:  Coal costs from  Xu et Al  (1989); implicit  price indbexas  tAken  fom  workshoet  DEFLATE2.wkl.How rar Hu  ChLRue  I1duvY  Grow?  219
TABLZ  7:  PRICt INDIn  EXTRACTD  MOM  INDUSAL
Ouwnr  VALUz  DATA
SOB
Year  PR1CE  INDEX  ANNUAL % CHANGE  DIFFERENTLAL
SOE  COE  IN PRICE LEVEL  PRCE  CHANGE
SOE  COE  percentage  poin
Combined  Data for All 15 Banch
1978  0.96  0.97  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.
1979  0.98  0.97  1.84  -0.12  1.97
1980  0.99  0.96  1.09  -0.60  1.69
1981  1.00  0.96  0.38  0.04  0.35
1982  1.00  0.95  0.10  .1.06  1.17
1983  1.00  0.95  .0.05  4.36  0.41
1984  1.02  0.96  1.95  0.72  1.23
1985  1.08  1.00  6.30  4.28  2.02
1986  1.12  1.01  3.33  1.50  1.83
1987  1.20  1.05  7.07  3.71  3.36
Soure:  Worksheet  DEFLATE.wkil.30  How F  Has ChIldmsy  Grows?
TAJLT 6S  ZNUGY PRODUCtMITY  PI CN  INDUMY
OmciAL DATA,  1918-7
You  Eneg  UN  Annual  Pecmu
PA 10  Milioa  Chanp in
Yuan  of OVIO  Ewa
(ton  std. coal)  Productivity
1980  78411  ns.
1981  72380  8.33
1932  70374  2.85
1983  6704S  4.97
1984  62592  7.11
1985  56872  10.06
1986
1987How FuM  HMm  Chlmue  Ir4Wi  Gru?  31
TAILE  9:  OmciAL ENERGY  DATA  FOR  CHNE  INDUSTRY  BY  BRANCH,
1980-198S
A. Energy  consumption  in tons of standard  coal per 100 million
yuas of GVIO at 1980 pricu
branch  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985
1  164549  156603  150471  147084  142632  132  .
2  99124  99492  96161  93911  93926  92062
3  162468  157580  155472  152577  151079  156652
4  83429  76069  73443  69541  65960  60040
5  148546  136517  127091  118445  110716  98176
6  32538  31160  29269  25823  22886  18894
7  217821  21552S  215280  20959S  193233  180283
8  36959  37293  33711  38041  33546  34263
9  131594  127529  128454  135213  128038  100577
10  32537  31258  29761  30040  28645  28135
11  701  666  712  662  633  717
12  6839  6371  6721  5813  5054  5224
13  173163  144298  161236  168497  165408  154314
14  11482  12205  12169  12370  11549  11476
1S  77476  73383  70686  66480  61444  58634
total  78411  72380  70374  67045  62592  56872
B. Annual  percentage  rise  in GVIO per ton  of standard  coal  consumed
brmnch  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985
1  5.07  4.08  2.30  3.12  7.56
2  -0.37  3.46  2.40  -0.02  2.02
3  3.10  1.36  1.90  0.99  -3.56
4  9.68  3.58  5.61  5.43  9.86
5  8.81  7.42  7.30  6.98  12.77
6  4.42  6.46  13.34  12.83  21.13
7  1.07  0.11  2.71  8.47  7.18
8  -0.90  10.63  -11.38  13.40  -2.09
9  3.19  -0.72  -5.00  5.60  27.30
10  4.09  5.03  -0.93  4.87  1.81
11  5.26  -6.46  7.55  4.58  -11.72
12  7.35  -5.21  15.62  15.02  -3.2S
13  20.00  -10.51  -4.31  1.87  7.19
14  -5.92  0.30  -1.62  7.11  0.64
15  5.58  3.82  6.33  8.20  4.79
total  8.33  2.85  4.97  7.11  10.06
Source: Data taken  or calculated  from Energy 1986,  p.  16.32 How  F  Hmm  ChL.e Iadaiy otrP
TAMZ 10:  GVIO DATA  FOR  15 BRANCHS  (100 MLION  YUAN,  1980 PrICES)
A. Derived from Statistics  of Energy Consumption and  Efficiency, 1980-1985
brunch  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985
1  473.05  456.70  485.21  523.71  579.39  664.04
2  189.16  194.89  207.05  220.21  235.61  272.75
3  159.79  157.25  166.33  173.34  194.73  208.42
4  290.07  282.11  287.98  310.03  334.14  416.39
5  565.08  591.43  658.98  741.10  830.32  926.70
6  1!21.77  1079.91  1225.19  1440.58  1756.97  2235.10
7  196.80  195.10  222.59  24S.43  287.27  350.62
8  105.52  104.85  112.13  116.19  126.69  133.09
9  112.32  121.78  129.33  134.08  151.91  213.17
10  612.23  690.06  755.69  794.27  865.77  951.84
11  727.53  855.86  870.79  951.66  1090.05  850.77
12  128.67  147.54  141.35  153.11  178.08  199.08
13  51  63  58.56  55.69  57.03  62.21  76.47
14  26.13  69.64  73.96  81.65  92.65  108.05
15  168.18  172.25  188.72  212.70  250.80  309.55
total  4745.51  4946.81  5330.66  5900.37  6721.95  7962.79
B.  Published  GVIO  daa: SOE+  COE  Independent  Units, 1980  pricas
1  470.42  452.32  481.13  519.19  578.22  657.4
2  186.35  190.35  202.29  211.32  224.72  268.29
3  15S.48  152.04  161.48  173.01  188.83  204.69
4  285.22  278.63  284.43  305.29  334.37  371.82
5  555.34  S81.23  647.04  721.12  807.57  899.91
6  1081.82  1039.19  1178.18  1382.13  1670.42  2114.46
7  181.02  180.18  205.45  227.13  266.29  322.17
8  93.75  94.75  100.47  103.71  112.93  118.36
9  523.82  600.53  6S8.76  690.6'  756.97  854.11
10  707.42  827.08  830.69  922.22  1043.18  1213.85
11  121.31  138.96  134.07  145.89  169.94  186.21
12  50.14  56,60  S3.S8  54.21  59.11  72.06
13  171.82  171.87  120.66  125.65  89.49  105.68
14  9.84  11.13  73.65  79.43  141.1  19S.18
15  153.69  154.89  170.61  187.9  211.27  247.82
total  4752.45  4929.75  5302.49  S848.93  6654.41  7832.01
(continued)HOw  Fuc Mu  CAba. 1Ay  Oeu  t  is
TABLE  10: aoIO DATA  FOR  15 BLgCNz  (100 MWoN  YUAN,  1930 PRC=)  (On*imAsoa)
branch  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1935
C. GVIO discrepancy:  derived  - publishd  u  X of derived  figurn
1  0.56  0.96  0.84  0.86  0.20  1.00
2  1.48  2.33  2.30  4.04  4.62  1.64
3  2.69  3.32  2.92  2.99  3.03  1.79
4  1.67  1.23  1.23  1.53  -0.07  10.70
5  1.72  1.72  1.81  2.70  2.74  2.89
6  3.56  3.77  3.84  4.06  4.93  5.40
7  7.55  7.65  7.70  7.45  7.30  8.11
8  11.16  9.63  10.40  10.74  10.86  11.07
9  -370.84  -393.14  -409.15  -41S.11  -398.31  -300.67
10  -IS.SS  -19.86  -9.93  -16.11  -20.49  -27.53
11  83.33  83.76  84.60  84.67  84.41  78.11
12  61.03  61.64  62.09  64.59  66.81  63.80
13  -232.80  -193.49  -116.6S  -120.31  -43.85  -38.20
14  62.34  84.01  0.42  2.66  -52.30  -80.64
1S  8.62  10.08  9.60  11.66  15.76  19.94
tota  -0.15  0.34  0.53  0.87  1.00  1.64
A7. Revised calcula*io: os  sad. coal per Yi yua  CIVIO,P80
1  16.55  15.81  1S.17  14.84  14.29  13.40
2  10.06  10.19  9.84  9.79  9.85  9.36
3  16.70  16.30  16.01  15.73  1S.58  15.95
4  8.48  7.70  7.44  7.06  6.59  6.72
5  15.12  13.89  12.94  12.17  11.38  10.11
6  3.37  3.24  3.04  2.69  2.41  2.00
7  23.56  2..4  23.32  22.65  20.85  19.62
8  4.16  4.13  3.76  4.26  3.76  3.85
9  2.79  2.59  2.52  2.62  2.57  2.51
10  2.82  2.61  2.71  2.S9  2.38  2.21
11  0.42  0.41  0.46  0.43  0.41  0.33
12  1.75  1.66  1.77  1.64  1.52  1.44
13  S.20  4.92  7.44  7.65  11.50  11.17
14  3.05  7.63  1.22  1.27  0.76  0.64
15  8.48  8.16  7.82  7.53  7.29  7.32
Toal  7.83  7,26  7.07  6.76  6.32  5.7834  Now Past Mu  C%kwe Indi&y  Gro?
TABLE  11:  RriD  CALCULATON:  ANNUAL  EczNT  iNcRrAC IN ENEGY PRODUCTVTY  BASED  ON
PCAL  ENERGY  CONSUmpON  AND  PUBnL  GVIO DATA
Cumuluivi
Total
branch  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1980/1985
1  4.65  4.20  2.28  3.81  6.70  23.53
2  -1.23  3.50  0.57  .0.63  5.22  7.50
3  2.44  1.77  1.82  0.95  .32  4.67
4  10.16  3.58  5.29  7.14  -1.97  26.19
5  8.81  7.32  6.33  6.93  12.60  49.S1
6  4.19  6.39  13.08  11.81  20.53  68.93
7  0.96  0.06  2.99  8.65  6.25  20.09
8  0.81  9.68  -11.72  13.25  -2.32  7.98
9  8.08  2.50  .3.89  2.16  2.36  11.34
10  7.97  -3.67  4.64  8.83  7.76  27.63
11  2.49  -11.30  7.09  6.36  23.94  28.34
12  5.67  -6.33  8.00  7.83  5.50  21.60
13  S.83  -33.94  -2.69  -33.48  2.98  -53.40
14  -60.06  524.68  -3.84  67.57  19.36  379.90
1S  3.89  4.37  3.90  3.17  -0.41  15.76
total  7.80  2.66  4.60  6.97  9.35  35.41How Fast  Hai Chinea Indawsy Growu?  35
TABLE  12:  ENERGY  DATA  FOR STATE  SECTOR  INDEPENDENT  UNiTS, 40 BRANCES,
1980 AND  1985
A. Raw Data from Indusuial Cesus
Energy Consunption  Tone of *td. coal per
10,000 tons std. coal  10,000 yuan of GVIO
Branch  1980  1985  1980  1985
1  2283  2543  18.24  16.22
2  1084  1147  8.27  7.15
3  46  62  5.61  5.68
4  106  116  5.3  4.18
5  69  76  6.61  6.11
6  124  132  7.65  8.39
7  0.0001  0.0001  3.2  3.87
a  156  183  4.06  4.98
9  44  65  4.04  3.91
10  740  1120  2.21  2.31
11  311  447  5.64  4.53
12  36  68  0.41  0.43
13  1  5  0.68  0.2
14  952  1234  1.72  1.63
iS  10  13  0.44  0.42
16  42  48  1.87  1.78
17  91  132  4.S  5.46
i8  9  10  1.89  1.5
19  594  746  9.21  8.15
20  27  36  0.79  0.67
21  11  13  0.86  0.58
22  6  9  1.27  0.87
23  7431  9127  38.89  34.44
24  1560  1613  9.43  7.76
25  300  330  23.08  20.37
26  5829  6211  18.08  13.78
27  237  322  3.97  2.68
28  321  481  9.71  5.4
29  160  195  2.19  1.84
30  39  59  1.58  1.37
31  2631  3594  21.44  19.34
32  5687  6397  19.01  16.36
33  620  754  5.2  4.64
34  135  IS4  2.69  2.19
3S  1170  1343  3.17  2.1
3  370  43S  A.51  1.66
37  194  224  1.8S  1.23
38  80  99  1.32  0.5
39  38  43  1.28  0.89
40  4  7  1.17  1.31
sum  33S48.00  39593.00  8.91  6.99
Source: Indistia  ceamns  materias,  3: 346-355
(¢e)36  How Fwzi  Has Chin se Indsany Grown?
TABLE  12:  ENERGY  DATA  FOR  STATE  SEcTOR  INDEPENDENT  UNITS,  40 BRANCHES,
1980 AND  1985 (contiustion)
B. Analysis  and Consistency  Check: Energy Data for 40 branches  of State Industry
% rise
in energy
productivity  Derived GVIO  Published  OVIO  %  diff.
1980/15  Yi Yuan  (Yi Yuan)  1985
Branch  1980  198S  1980  1985
1  12.45  125.16  156.78  1S6.19  -0.38
2  15.66  131.08  160.42  161.14  0.4S
3  -1.23  8.20  10.92  10.86  -O.S1
4  26.79  20.00  7.75  27.79  0.14
5  8.18  10.44  12.44  11.99  -3.61
6  -8.82  16.21  15.73  15.75  0.11
7  -17.31  0.00  0.00  0.02  77300.00
8  -18.47  38.4  36.75  36.95  0.55
9  3.32  10.89  16.62  16.58  -0.26
10  -4.33  334.84  484.85  483.00  -0.38
11  24.50  55.14  98.68  96.83  -1.87
12  -4.65  87.80  158.14  156.90  -0.78
13  240.00  1.47  2S.00  23.82  -4.72
14  5,52  553.49  757.06  754.70  -0.31
1S  4.76  22.73  30.95  31.71  2.45
16  5.06  22.46  26.97  26.74  -0.54
17  -17.58  20.22  24.18  24.73  2.29
18  26.00  4.76  6.67  6.55  -1.75
19  13.01  64.50  91.53  90.30  -1.35
20  17.91  34.18  53.73  54.25  0.97
2  1  26.47  12.79  19.12  19.31  1.01
22  45.98  4.72  10.34  10.09  -2.46
23  12.92  191.08  265.01  263.85  -0.44
24  21.52  165.43  207.86  207.50  -0.17
25  10.59  13.00  15.81  15.85  0.24
26  31.20  322.40  450.73  449.98  -0.17
27  48.13  59.70  120.15  119.55  -0.S0
28  79.81  33.06  89.07  90.12  1.17
29  19.02  73.06  105.98  106.12  0.13
30  15.3^  24.68  43.07  43.63  1.31
31  10.86  122.71  185.83  185.62  -0.11
32  16.20  299.16  391.01  391.90  0.23
33  12.07  119.23  162.50  163.94  0.89
34  22.83  50.19  70.32  69.52  -1.14
35  50.95  369.09  639.52  636.38  -0.49
36  51.20  147.41  262.05  261.30  -0.29
37  50.41  104.86  182.11  181.43  -0.38
38  164.00  60.61  198.00  196.43  -0.79
39  43.82  29.69  48.31  48.42  .22
40  -14.60  3.42  5.11  9.03  76.73
sum  27.47  3768.28  5667.07  5656.77  -0.18How Fast HIt  Chinse Industy  Grown?  37
TABLE  13:  RouGH CONVERSON  OF SOE ENERGY  .1ATA  TO  1S
BRANCH  FORMAT
Energy  Cona.  Derived  GV1O,P80  Ton aid coal per  % Rui
Bmnch  lOOOt  stid  coal  Yi  yuan  10000  yuan GVIO  GVIO/E
1980  1985  1980  1985  1980  1985  1980,85
1. Using DEFIVED GVIO  DATA
1  6459  7329  446.59  592.18  14.46  12.38  16.86
2  7431  9127  191.08  265.01  38.89  34.44  12.92
3  2583  2873  138.16  172.59  18.70  16.65  12.31
4  2644  2760  296.51  368.28  8.92  7.49  18.99
5  6265  6787  479.84  719.92  13.06  9.43  38.49
6  1987  2298  761.84  1400.32  2.61  1.64  58.93
7  2824  3802  149.36  214.00  18.91  17.77  6.42
8  256  325  63.41  67.59  4.04  4.81  -16.04
9  1087  1635  477.79  741.66  2.28  2.20  3.20
10  1273  1715  586.55  846.13  2.17  2.03  7.08
11  10  13  22.73  20.95  0.44  0.42  4.76
12  42  48  22.46  26.97  1.87  1.78  5.06
13  594  746  64.50  91.53  9.21  8.15  13.01
14  44  58  51.69  83.19  0.85  0.70  22.09
15  49  77  15.78  46.73  3.11  1.65  88.46
Sum  33548  39593  3768.28  5667.07  8.90  6.99  27.43
2. Using P1WULISHED  GVIO data
1  6459  7329  447.90. 594.50  14.42  12.33  16.97
2  7431  9127  14.71  263.85  40.23  34.59  16.30
3  2583  2873  136.79  169.03  18.88  17.00  11.10
4  2644  2760  283.99  368.64  9.31  7.49  24.35
5  6265  6787  451.95  661.83  13.86  10.25  35.18
6  1987  2298  768.28  1390.66  2.59  1.65  56.51
7  2824  3802  101.09  159.09  27.94  23.90  16.89
8  256  325  67.S6  69.88  3.79  4.65  -18.53
9  1087  1635  493.22  746.11  2.20  2.19  0.57
10  1273  1715  610.92  859.30  2.08  2.00  4.41
11  10  13  20.47  31.71  0.49  0.41  19.16
12  42  48  21.88  26.74  1.92  1.80  6.94
13  594  746  120.38  83.69  4.93  8.91  -44.64
14  44  58  0.00  83.65  0.69
15  49  77  82.28  148.08  0.60  0.52  14.53
Sum  33548  39593  3791.42  5656.76  8.85  7.00  26.42
Note: 'published  GVIO for 1S branches is from DEFLATE.wkl.  Derived GVIO daa  comes from collpeing
40-branch  GVIO  figure implicit in th  eergy  and energy/GVIO  figur.  into 15 bmnch.s following  the algorithm
contained  in workshoot  DATA86.wkl, omitting ub-branch  adjuatmets for which  no data are available.  *Yi yuan
- 100,000,000  Yuan.38  How Fast HMs  Chiir  Indamuyr  Grown.?
TABLI 14:  TRIAL  CALCULATION  OF ZNERGY  CONSUWrnON  AND  PRODUCTITY  FOR  COLLCTm
INDUSTRY  (INCLUDING  NON-INDEPENDENT  UNITS  AND  "OTHER"OwNERmu  FORMS)  1980 AND  1955
1. Using DERIVED  GVIO figur.
Derived
FAwvy  cons.  OVIO  Yi  P80  Ton utd  coal per  % RiPe
Bralch  lOOCKt  std coal  1980  1985  10000  yuan OVIO  GVIO/E
1980  1985  1980  1955  1980/85
1  1325  1477  26.46  71.86  50.07  20.55  143.60
2  -5556  -6616  -1.92  7.74  2893.17  -854.85  -438.44
3  13  392  21.62  35.83  0.60  10.94  -94.50
4  -224  -260  -6.44  48.11  34.79  -S.40  -743.73
5  2129  2311  85.24  206.78  24.98  11.18  123.50
6  1663  1925  359.93  834.78  4.62  2.31  100.36
7  1441  2519  46.44  136.61  31.03  18.44  68.28
8  134  131  42.11  65.50  3.18  2.00  59.09
9  391  509  -365.47  -528.49  -1.07  -0.96  11.08
10  719  963  25.68  105.71  28.00  9.11  207.36
11  41  48  704.80  819.81  0.06  0.06  -0.65
12  46  S6  106.21  172.11  0.43  0.33  33.11
13  300  434  -12.87  -15.07  .23.3  -28.81  -19.06
14  -14  66  -25.56  24.86  0.!'  2.66  -79.37
15  1254  1738  152.40  262.81  8.23  6.61  24.43
Sum  3662  5693  977.23  2295.72  3.7S  2.48  51.11
Publishe  OVIO  PFrent Difference
Branch  Yi Yuan, P80  (Deived-publshed)
As perc  of Derived
1980  1985  1980  1985
1  22.51  62.90  .14.93  -12.46
2  1.65  4.44  -155.92  -42.63
3  18.69  35.66  -13.56  -0.47
4  1.23  3.18  -119.10  -93.39
5  103.39  237.98.  21.30  15.09
6  313.54  725.86  -12.89  -13.05
7  79.92  163.08  72.09  19.38
8  26.18  52.71  -37.84  -19.53
9  35.6  108.00  -109.74  -120.44
10  96.5  354.55  275.79  235.40
11  100.33  154.50  -85.69  -81.15
12  28.26  4S.32  -73.39  -73.67
13  51.44  52.88  -499.77  -450.98
14  9.84  36.33  -138.49  247.30
I5  71.41  87.86  -53.14  -66.57
Sum  960.99  2175.25  -1.66  -5.25
Note:  published  COB  OVIO we  from  DEPLATE.wkl.
(cmmdHow Fan HE  Oshna  ladwauy  Groww? 39
TABLE  14:  TRuAL  CALcuLATiON  OF  zNzRGY CONSUWnON  ANUD  PRoDucTIVIY FOR  COLLECTIVE  INDUSTRY
(INCLUDING  NON-INDEPENDENT  UNITS  AND  "OTMERN  OwNERsH FORUS)  1980 AND  1985 (continuaton)
2. Using Pubbshed  GVIO Figures
Energy Cons.  OVIO  Yi P80  Ton std coal per  % Rise
Branch  10000t  atd coal  1980  1985  10000  yu  ff GVIO  GVIO/E
1980  1985  1980  1985  1980/85
1  1325  1477  22.51  62.90  58.85  23.48  150.62
2  -5S56  -6616  1.65  4.44  -3372.19  -1490.09  126.31
3  13  392  18.69  35.66  0.70  10.99  -93.67
4  -224  -260  1.23  3.18  -182.11  -81.76  122.74
5  2129  2311  103.39  238.08  20.59  9.71  112.14
6  1663  1925  313.5'  723.80  5.30  2.66  99.42
7  1441  2519  79.93  163.08  18.03  15.45  16.72
8  134  131  26.18  48.48  5.12  2.70  89.39
9  391  509  3S.60  108.00  10.93  4.71  133.03
10  719  963  96.50  354.55  7.45  2.72  174.33
11  41  48  100.83  154.S0  0.41  0.31  30.88
12  46  56  28.26  45.32  1.63  1.24  31.71
13  300  434  51.44  21.99  5.83  19.74  -70.45
14  -14  66  9.84  111.53  -1.42  0.59  -340.43
15  12S4  1738  71.41  99.74  17.56  17.43  0.78
Sum  3662  5693  961.01  2175.25  3.81  2.62  45.6040  How  Fdw  ha, as.u. Indumy  Gam"?
TABLJ  15:  PzatCzNT  CHANCE  iN JNDUIIRIAL  ENzaGY  IRoDucTTY  roFO
15 BUSNcuS, 1980/85
ToWl  Stale  Collective+
1  23.53  16.97  150.62
2  7.S0  16.30  126.31
3  4.67  11.10  -93.67
4  26.19  24.35  122.74
s  49.S1  35.18  112.14
6  68.93  56.51  99.42
7  20.09  16.89  16.72
a  7.98  -18.53  89.39
9  11.34  0.57  133.03
10  27.63  4.41  174.33
11  28.34  19.16  30.88
12  21.60  6.94  31.71
13  -53.40  -44.64  -70.45
14  379.90  n.a.*  -340.43
15  15.76  14.53  0.78
Totl  35.41  26.42  45.60
Souem: Table  11, 12, and 13.  Baund  on calculatins using  publishe raher  than derived daft for brmach  OVIO.
*Branches  13 and 14 should be meged in a revinsd  ca1ulatio  underlying  outt  dat  for thee two bncls  ame
jumbled.How  Fa Ns  OuLw hdmty Oro  41
TABL 16: DATA  ON  wENGY  SAVYNGSo,  1980)J35
1. Industry  Above  the Ville  Level, 1S  BraOch.
Energy  Ue  in 19t5  Enegy  Savinp
10,000 Tos
St.  Coal  10000l  pero"
1980  Acoal  *Svinge  of tow
bruach  Relaios  B  (A.B)/B
A
1  10878  8806  0.235  2072  16.01
2  2699  2511  0.075  188  1.46
3  3418  3265  0.047  153  1.18
4  31SS  2500  0.262  655  S.06
5  13602  9091  0.495  4504  34.51
6  7134  4223  0.689  2911  22.50
7  7591  6321  0.201  1270  9.81
a  492  456  0.080  36  0.28
9  2387  2144  0.113  243  1.83
10  3418  2678  0.276  740  5.72
11  78  61  0.283  17  0.13
12  126  104  0.216  22  0.17
13  5S0  1180  40.534  630  4.47
14  595  124  3.799  471  3.64
15  2101  1115  0.151  286  2.21
total  58225  45286  0.256  12939  100.00
Excluding
MB&CHEM  37489  31965  0.173  5524  42.69
2. Sta  Sector idespndat Aooxm*ing  Units,  40 bunches
1  2849  2543  0.120  306  4.09
2  1333  1147  0.162  156  2.48
3  61  62  -0.017  -1  .0.01
4  147  116  0.270  31  0.42
S  79  76  0.043  3  0.04
6  120  132  4.087  -12  .0.15
7  0  0  639.000  0  0.00
I  150  183  4.110  -33  .0.44
9  67  65  0.031  2  0.03
10  1067  1120  .0.047  -53  .0.70
(-4""42  How Fast Has Ch*ne ?sdauy Groins?
TABLE  16:  DATA  ON  "ENERGY  SAVINGS,.  1980-198S  (continualioa)
2. Stae Sector  Idependent  Accounting  Units, 40 banches
Energy Use in 1985  Energy Savings
10,000  Tonb
Sd.  Coal  100001  porcmi
1980  Actu  *Saving  of  total
branch  Relations  B  (A-B)/B
A
11  546  447  0.222  99  1.33
12  64  68  -0.054  -4  40.05
13  16  5  2.240  11  0.15
14  1298  1234  0.052  64  0.86
1S  14  13  0.073  1  0.01
16  50  48  0.042  2  0.03
17  111  132  -0.157  -21  40.28
i8  12  10  0.238  2  0.03
19  832  746  0.115  86  1.15
20  43  36  0.190  7  0.09
21  17  13  0.277  4  0.05
2  13  9  0.424  4  0.05
23  10261  9127  0.124  1134  15.17
24  1957  1613  0.213  344  4.60
25  366  330  0.109  36  0.48
26  8136  6211  0.310  1925  25.74
27  475  322  0.474  153  2.04
28  875  481  0.819  394  5.27
29  232  195  0.192  37  0.50
30  69  59  0.168  10  0.13
31  3980  3594  0.107  386  5.16
32  7450  6397  0.165  1053  14.08
33  852  754  0.131  98  1.32
34  187  154  0.214  33  0.44
35  2017  1343  0.502  674  9.02
36  656  435  0.508  221  2.95
37  336  224  0.498  112  1.49
38  259  99  1.619  160  2.14
39  62  43  0.441  19  0.25
40  11  7  0.509  4  0.05
TOTAL  47070  39593  0.189  7477  100.00
SUM  Less
MB&Chem  34642  30508  0.135  4134  55.3How  Fan Has  Chnes Induoy Grown? 43
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